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Abstract 
A descriptive overview of the present law 
applicable to 
contracts for the Sale of Goods with parti
cular concentration 
on the issues of consumer protection and p
roduct liability. 
Brief consideration is given to the failur
e of the New 
Zealand law to develop towards the imposit
ion of strict 
liability upon manufacturers for harm that
 their products 
cause not only to purchasers but to users, 
consumers and 
bystanders. The remedies available to pur
chasers and other 
consumers under the Sale of Goods Act 1908
, Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979, Fair Trading Act 1988 a
nd Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 are canvassed. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents
 page, footnotes 
and bibliography) comprises approximately 
13798 words. 
Introduction and brief history 
In its annual report to Parliament for the year ending 31 
December 1983 the now disbanded Consumer Council (1) stated·-
"The New Zealand public needs the protection of effective 
product safety legislation ... The Council knows, from the 
never ending stream of complaints it handles involving the 
Sale of Goods Act, that a complete revision of the present 
legislation is a high priority ... " (2) 
A decade later on March 17th 1993 when introducing the Consumer 
Guarantees Bill into the House, the Minister of Consumer 
Affairs was to say:-
"The Sale of Goods Act has been looked at by everyone from 
the Business Round Table, to manufacturers, to wholesalers, 
to retailers and they are satisfied that the Sale of Goods 
Act 1908 is still appropriate for today's transactions 
between commercial traders .. " (3) 
The Bill was referred to the Commerce and Marketing (select) 
(3) committee which reported back to the House on 21st July 
1993. All speakers to the introduction of the Bill agreed that 
revision of the Sale of Goods Act (even if only partial) was 
long overdue. The Bill was passed as amended and its 
provisions become enforceable on 1st July 1994. 
The Sale of Goods Act 1908 is a consolidation of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1895 and sections 10 and 11 of the Merchantile Agents 
Act 1890. (4) As such it is the direct descendant of the Sale 
(1) NZ Consumer Council Act 1966 (Repeal Act 1988) 
(2) Parliamentary debates (Hansard) Vol 522 6910 
(3) Parliamentary Bulletin 9.3.14 5 July 1993 
(4) All references are to the 1908 Act unless otherwise 
indicated 
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of Goods bill presented to the Westminster parliament in 1889. 
Drafted by Sir McKenzie Chalmers (5) (also the draftsman of the 
Bills of Exchange Act) the bill lapsed that year and was, 
following considerable amendment, later reintroduced and 
enacted as the Sale of Goods Act 1983. (6) 
Chalmer's intention had been to codify the existing common law 
but the Act as passed did not do so. Nor did it constitute in 
any respect a "code" as it contained a specific saving of "the 
rules of the common law".(7) Thus the act set out rules that 
ran parallel to, and altered the common law but in some 
respects did not entirely replace it. As an example the common 
law continued to be the relevant law in New Zealand concerning 
the availability of cancellation as a remedy for innocent 
misrepresentation up until the enactment of the Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979. 
The Westminster Act was adopted as a basis for local law 
throughout the British Empire. It proved a hardy piece of 
legislation yet dissatisfaction with its rules and operation is 
as old as the Act itself. Much of this dissatisfaction has 
arisen as a response to the changing times since its passage. 
The Act proceeds on the basis of a view that in all cases the 
parties to a sale transaction have an equality of bargaining 
power in negotiating to reach the terms of the contract. 
It is doubtful that this was true in the nineteenth century and 
(5) "Chalmers Sale of Goods" Butterworths London now in its 
17th edition began life as Chalmers commentary on his bill. 
(6) Despite being enacted in 1894 
(7) Now s60(2). Note debate in later years as to the 
preservation of the rules of equity. 
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it is certainly not the case today. The nineteenth century 
concept of ''caveat emptor" (with its expectations that the 
purchaser would inspect the goods, examine them to be sure they 
were satisfactory for their intended use and could recover, 
under the contract with the seller, only if there existed a 
term of the contract, warranty or express guarantee as to the 
quality and fitness for purpose of those goods that had been 
breached by the seller) was modified by the Act's imposition of 
statutory terms that were to be implied into contracts for the 
sale of goods. These terms, being "guarantees'' of sellers 
title, fitness for purpose and merchantable quality were the 
only terms so implied and the vendor could, if he so desired 
and the purchaser agreed, contract out of their application to 
a particular sale. 
The reality today for most purchasers is that the packaging of 
goods may prevent any real attempt at examination prior to 
purchase. This is particularly so with "tamper-proof'' food and 
pharmaceutical product packaging. In the case of manufactured 
goods the design and makeup of the item may be so complex as to 
be incomprehensible to the layman. Operative parts and 
machinery may be sealed from the view of even the expert 
purchaser. 
In the one hundred years since the unfortunate Mrs Carlill 
purchased the carbolic smokeball that so singularly failed to 
prevent her influenza, advertising has reached unforseen levels 
of pitch and saturation. 
More importantly the Sale of Goods Act ignores the role 
of the manufacturer in the provision of goods to the end user 
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or consumer. Relatively few traders today make their own 
products and sell them directly to the end user . The reality 
for the purchaser is that he will buy goods from a retailer who 
in his turn buys from the wholesaler or importer who in turn 
buys from the manufacturer. The Sale of Goods Act does not 
interfere with privity of contract hence while each of these 
individual sale contracts may be sued upon by the parties to it 
no other person is in a position to do so. 
Product Liability 
The term ''product liability" is used to define "the area of law 
involving the liability of those who supply goods or products 
for the use of others to purchasers, users and bystanders for 
losses of various kinds resulting from so-called defects in 
those products". (8) It expresses the concept that all 
persons involved in the provision of goods, and in particular 
the manufacturer, owe a duty of care to the end user relating 
to the safety or fitness for use of the product. 
The end user may be harmed in a number of ways by a faulty 
product. They may suffer direct physical harm (for example 
poisoning), damage or loss of the product itself, damage or 
loss of property (other than the actual product) caused by the 
product fault (as with the electric heater that burns down the 
purchaser's house) or pure economic loss (loss of the bargain, 
financial loss consequent to the loss). 
(8) See chapter 17 :Prosser & Keeton on Torts West Publishing 
St. Paul Minn. 
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There are other issues of consumer protection that do not fall 
within the product liability definition. The end-user of goods 
may be harmed by being mislead by the seller or manufacturer as 
to the seller's title, the suitability of the goods for a set 
purpose, as well as by their safety or make up. 
Other jurisdictions have over the last fifty years developed 
regimes of manufacturer's product liability yet this has not 
occurred in New Zealand. In Australia the Trade Practices Act 
1974 modified the rule of privity of contract allowing claims 
against manufacturers to go forward and imposed liability in a 
range of situations. Previous legislation in New Zealand has 
dealt with other consumer protection issues, in particular 
those that arise out of statements made concerning goods prior 
to the sale contract being entered into (culminating in the 
provisions contained in the Fair Trading Act) yet the Consumer 
Guarantees Act is the first legislative attempt (9) to relax 
the rule of privity and impose liability on manufacturers post-
sale for the benefit of the end user. 
There are good reasons to make manufacturers directly liable to 
the end user of their products. Such liability acts as a 
disincentive to the supply of faulty products and to the making 
of false claims about them. It is a cost against which 
manufacturers may insure. Further it recognises the alteration 
in social policy from the nineteenth century view towards the 
expectation by the end user that a manufacturer will take 
(9) Note: The Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 gives third party 
beneficiaries limited rights to enforce contractual 
promises made in their favour by the contracting parties. 
responsibility for the safety and proper functioning of its 
goods. In overseas jurisdictions a regime of strict 
manufacturers liability has evolved, by judicial and 
legislative intervention as in the United Kingdom and Australia 
and United States. (10) 
This paper examines the present state of the law and asks 
whether there are reasons, specific to the New Zealand 
jurisdiction, that negated the need for an expanded product 
liability regime. 
The present law and the privity problem 
The legal doctrine of contractual privity is one which is 
almost incomprehensible to the lay person. Simply stated the 
doctrine prevents any person other than the actual parties to a 
contract from suing on it. Thus the purchaser at retail is 
prevented from suing the manufacturer of a faulty or defective 
product in contract as under the doctrine there exists no 
contract between them on which to base a suit. 
Equally unless there has been a formal assignment, a person who 
has been given or otherwise acquired the goods from the 
original purchaser cannot bring suit. The policy basis 
first clearly articulated in Winterbottom v Wright (11) was 
(10) Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK) 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust) 
Uniform Commercial Code 2-318 
American Restatement of Tort S402A 
(11) (1842) 10 M & W 519, 150 E.R. 402. Contract to provide a 
mail coach between two parties. Third party injured when a 
defect in the coach cased him to be thrown off it. Injured 
parties claim against maker of coach failed on ground no 
privity of contract between them. 
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that of the danger of opening the "floodgates" if such claims 
were to be allowed. This seems a nonsense to the lay person 
who has purchased the goods based on claims made or lures set 
in the manufacturers advertising and who naturally assumes that 
the manufacturer, whose brand or name appears on the product, 
will assume some responsibility for it. The doctrine also 
ignores the reality that people do not shop only for their own 
individual needs. 
Family or whanau members may shop for the entire group, all of 
whom will use or consume the goods,yet under the privity 
doctrine only the actual purchaser has a contract on which to 
sue and then only the vendor from whom the goods were 
purchased. 
There are several advantages for the purchaser in suing the 
actual vendor as opposed to any other person. The seller will 
normally be able to be easily identified, the seller's 
liability to the purchaser is strict, and his or her negligence 
does not have to be proved for a claim to succeed. There will 
however always be be situations where a claim against the 
seller is not an available option such as where the vendor has 
ceased to trade or is a man of straw. 
Until the enactment of the Consumer Guarantees Act the 
judicially developed concepts of collateral contract and the 
expansion of the tort of negligence remained the primary way 
for the end user to bring a claim against a person other than 
the seller. 
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Who is "the Consumer"? 
If a duty is to be owed concerning goods between persons who 
may not be the actual parties to the sale contract then the 
class of persons covered by the duty should be defined. 
It has long been accepted that there exist classes or 
categories of persons who are more in need of the law's 
protection in their contractual dealings for the sale of goods 
than was envisaged in the Sale of Goods Act. 
One such class is usually referred to as "the consumer" but 
while it is easy to agree that there may exist good policy 
reasons for the protection of "the consumer" in todays market 
it is less easy to determine exactly who "the consumer" is. 
One writer defined "consumers" as the 
"final or end users ... (of) goods and services produced in 
the economy". . . ( 12) . 
This definition in itself does not provide a test for 
determining which persons fall within the class. By accepting 
that some persons are more in need of the law's protection it 
becomes a given that some are in less of a need. If it is 
accepted that the businessmen, wholesalers and retailers 
as a class referred to by the Minister of Consumer Affairs in 
the passage from her introduction of the Consumer Guarantees 
Bill (quoted on page one of this paper) are capable of looking 
after themselves in the marketplace under the existing legal 
framework then should they not be excluded from any definition 
of "consumers"? To limit the definition to those who are 
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parties to the sale contract would leave the position as it is 
at present under the privity doctrine. "Consumer" needs to be 
defined more broadly than simply ''purchaser" to bring into the 
definition those who are users of the goods but who did not 
purchase them. 
There are a number of ways of formulating a test to define a 
consumer. The test can be based on the type or nature of 
the actual goods purchased, on the use to which such goods are 
usually put, on the value of the goods purchased, on the 
use it has been stated the goods are to be put to or by 
focusing on the person making the claim. 
Each test will operate to exclude some people who are arguably 
in need of the law's protection. 
The Uniform Commercial Code (US) 2-318 provides an example of a 
statutory definition of the class that focuses on the nature of 
the persons making the claim. ( 1 3 ) 
The Consumer Guarantees Act in contrast takes the type and 
nature approach mixed with a presumed usage by defining 
"consumer" as a person who acquires goods of :-
···" a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or 
household use". ( 14) 
(12) M J O'Grady "Consumer Remedies" (1982) 60 Can B Rev 
548,548 
(13) Uniform Commercial Code 2-318 .. " any natural person who 
is in the family or household of the buyer or who is a 
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such 
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods, and 
who is injured in person by breach of this warranty .. " 
See also Second Restatement of Torts 402A op cit. 
(14) Consumer Guarantees Act s2 
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No monetary limit is set on the goods acquired. This test 
effectively excludes the small business proprietor, the corner 
dairy owner in his day to day business dealings, from the 
applications of the Act yet he or she may be in no stronger a 
position vis a vis the manufacturer than is any other 
individual. 
Australia took a different approach when in the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (15) it accorded the status of "consumer" to all 
buyers of goods and services for a monetary value of less than 
A$40,000:00. This approach also carries with it some problems 
as while bringing the small business person within the frame 
of protection it may effectively exclude the non business 
person who, for example only, purchases an expensive motor 
vehicle. ( 16) 
The Sale of Goods Act 1908 and the preservation of the common 
law 
The 1908 Act remained, until the enactment of the Consumer 
Guarantees Act, the primary piece of legislation dealing with 
the contract for the sale of goods. The Sale of Goods Act has 
no impact on the provision of services whether in concert with 
the sale of goods or not. In contrast the Consumer Guarantees 
Act attempts for the first time in New Zealand to place both 
contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for the provision 
(15) Trade Practices Act 1974 4B(l)(b)(ii) 
(16) That the rich can also be gullible is clear and it is 
arguably not sound policy to exclude from protection the 
lay person who risks a great deal of money while the lower 
purchase price is protected. 
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of services within the same framework of obligations and 
remedies. 
The Consumer Guarantees Act will not repeal the Sale of Goods 
Act but will bring into being a further set of legal rules 
which will apply only to those particular "consumer'' sales 
which fall within its ambit. "Commercial" or business dealings 
will continue to be subject to the Sale of Goods Act. 
From its inception the Sale of Goods Act specifically preserved 
the then existing common law which continued to be relevant 
law. It put into place a set of rules that apply to contracts 
for the sale of goods and included terms that were to be 
implied into all sales such unless a different intention could 
be shown from the surrounding circumstances of the contract or 
the parties specifically made an exclusion. 
The Act introduced a "condition'' to be implied that the seller 
had the right to sell together with ''warranties" as to the 
enjoyment of quiet possession and that the goods would be free 
from any charge over them that could interfere with the rights 
of the purchaser. (17) 
The Act also implied terms into the contract of a condition 
that the ... ''goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose ... " 
(made known to vendor expressly or by implication) (18) 
and that goods .. ''shall be of merchantable quality .. " (19) 
(17) Sale of Goods Act 1908 sl4 
(18) Sale of Goods Act 1908 sl6 (a) 
(19) Sale of Goods Act 1908 sl6 (b). 
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As stated these were the only terms so implied into the 
contract and that they were as stated open to exclusion by way 
of the parties contracting out. This could be done less than 
explicitly. A vendor might provide their own express 
"guarantee" or "warranty" in the form of a written document 
signed by both parties on the sale. By virtue of being 
inconsistent with the relevant provision of the Act (Section 16 
(d)) that express guarantee would replace the implied terms 
thereunder. The purchaser however might have no real knowledge 
that they are giving up their statutory "rights" in exchange 
for what may be an illusory guarantee. 
The expressions used in the Act, of "condition" and "warranty" 
are terms of legal art and have little or no meaning to the lay 
person. The concept "merchantable quality" has little relation 
to what the consumer wants from the goods they purchase. 
The following paragraph taken from the introduction to the 
"Vernon Report" puts this clearly:- (20) 
"the legal remedies available to consumers who have bought 
defective goods are limited and largely ineffective. The 
Sale of Goods Act was drafted almost a century ago and 
bears no relation to the needs of modern consumers. Thus 
one of the most important conditions implied into contracts 
of sale by the Act is that the goods will be of 
"merchantable quality". The very words" merchantable 
quality" indicate that the Act is not appropriate to 
consumer transactions. The one thing that the consumer 
(20) G. Palmer/ M. Shields Introduction to "Post Sale Consumer 
legislation in New Zealand" (Report to Minister of Justice 
December 1987) Vernon 
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does not want to do with a purchase item is to resell it."
 
Furthermore the purchaser's remedies on a breach of an imp
lied 
warranty while practical in the commercial setting are not
 such 
as to be particularly helpful to a "consumer". 
They may (a) Set up against the seller the breach of warra
nty 
in diminution or extinction of the price. A useful remedy
 for 
the business purchaser on credit but of limited interest t
o the 
consumer who has already paid the agreed price, or (b) 
maintain an action against the seller for damages for the 
breach of warranty. (21) 
The method by which damages awarded are to be calculated 
is set out in the Act as :-
... "(2) The measure of such damages for breach of warranty
 is 
the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in 
the ordinary course of events, from the breach of 
warranty. 
(3) In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such 
loss is prima facie the difference between the value of 
the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the 
value they would have had if they had answered to the 
warranty." ... (22) 
These remedies assist the commercial purchaser whose inten
tion 
with regard to the goods is to use them in manufacturing o
ther 
goods, re-sell them or add value to them before selling the
m. 
(21) Sale of Goods Act 1908 s54 
(22) Sale of Goods Act 1908 s54 
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Damages are not necessarily the most desirable
 remedy for a 
"consumer''· They might well prefer a right to
 have the goods 
replaced or repaired. The purchaser of an item
 that while 
slightly defective (perhaps in appearance) sti
ll performs its 
function has no remedy under the Sale of Goods
 Act as the 
implied terms as to quality contained in sectio
n 16 may well 
have been satisfied. 
Nor does the Sale of Goods Act make any provis
ion for the 
consumers who is not the purchaser. (23) 
Furthermore the Act may also operate to preven
t the purchaser 
from cancelling the contract when they would m
ost like to do 
so. 
(23) A defect which the Consumer Guarantees Ac
t focuses on 
and attempts to remedy. 
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The Acceptance Problem 
The Sale of Goods Act proceeds on the basis th
at in most 
circumstances there will be an opportunity for 
the buyer to 
inspect the goods. As previously stated this p
resumption is 
often unrealistic. The Act goes further howev
er and may 
prevent the buyer of faulty goods from cancelli
ng the contract. 
Section 13(3) provides: 
.. "Where ...... the buyer has accepted the goods
 or part 
thereof .... the breach of any condition to be fu
lfilled by 
the seller can only be treated as a breach of w
arranty .. " 
Sections 36 and 37 set out the manner by which 
acceptance is to 
be deemed. 
Thus a buyer who is deemed to have "accepted" t
he goods will 
lose the right to cancel the contract on the br
each of the 
implied condition in section 14(a) as to the ve
ndor's title to 
sell. The results have been perceived to be u
nfair in many 
instances and there has been some considerable 
judicial 
stretching of the section 36(1) requirement of 
a "reasonable 
opportunity for examination" by the buyer in re
cognition of the 
difficulties a buyer may face in practically in
specting goods. 
Two cases illustrate the nature of the problem
. 
In Finch Motors~ Quin (Noll (24) the purchase
rs discovered 
the latent defects in the vehicle when it overh
eated while 
(24) [1980] 2 NZLR 519, 525. Held that the car 
as supplied was 
essentially capable but required repair and tha
t there had 
been a total failure of consideration. Further 
that the 
existence and seriousness of the latent defect(
s ) amounted 
to a breach of term implied by sl6(a) Sale of G
oods Act 
(fitness for purpose ) 
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towing their boat shortly after the pu
rchase. Whereas in 
Taylor v Combined Buyers Limited (25) 
the purchaser had 
possession and use of the "Calthorpe" 
motor car for some three 
months before the alleged discovery. 
On a cancellation of the contract by th
e buyer the Sale of 
Goods Act revests property in the good
s in the seller. (26) 
The buyer cannot therefore give good t
itle if he chooses to on-
sell the goods following a cancellatio
n. (27) This is not the 
case when a cancellation of contract i
s made under the 
Contractual Remedies Act which has imp
lications for "mixed'' 
contracts. 
Remedies available to the purchaser un
der the Sale of 
Goods Act 
The Act sets out under the Heading "Re
medies of the Buyer'' 
in sections 52 to 55 what the buyer ma
y seek to obtain on 
breach of the contract by the seller. 
In short these are ·-
Firstly, damages for non delivery; the
 measure of which is the 
... "estimated loss directly and natura
lly arising, in the 
ordinary course of events, from the se
ller's breach of the 
contract". (28) Where there is a mark
et for the goods then 
(25) [1924] NZLR 627 see also 629. Pur
chaser took possession 
and used car for some three months. Ac
tion for recision 
and/or damages on grounds fraudulent m
isrepresentation 
that car was new or in the alternate o
n ground of a breach 
of implied condition of merchantable q
uality and 
reasonable fitness for purpose. Held (
1) fraud not 
substantiated (2) Sale by description 
in terms of ssl5 & 
16 Sale of Goods Act. 
(26) S22(3) has the same effect 
(27) But note sections 25, 26 and 27 S
ale of Goods Act 
(28) S52 (2) Sale of Goods Act 
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the quantum of damages is to be ascertained by taking the 
difference between the contract price and the current or m
arket 
value of the goods. (29) Secondly specific performance. 
This 
remedy may only to be of interest to the purchaser who had
 
ordered a specifically defined or custom made item. 
And thirdly (as previously discussed) damages for breach 
of 
warranty and conditions (30) that the purchaser either ele
cts 
or is required by the rule regarding "acceptance" to treat
 as 
breach of warranty. (31) There would I suggest be few, if 
any, 
non-lawyers to whom the preservation by the Act of the war
ranty 
/ condition dichotomy (32) would have any real meaning. T
he 
result is that the rules governing sale transactions conta
ined 
in the Act are unclear and difficult to follow for the lay
 
person. 
Contract and Collateral Contract 
With preservation of the common law by the Sale of Goods A
ct, 
the law of contract where not specifically altered by the 
Act 
continued to apply to contracts for the sale of goods. Th
e 
purchaser would of course have a right to sue on the contr
act 
with the vendor if there has been a breach. (Subject to
 
privity). The courts have found that where goods have been
 
marketed to the end user through a series of suppliers and
 the 
end user did not purchase directly from the manufacturer th
en a 
"collateral contract" between that purchaser and the 
(29) S52 ( 3 ) Sale of Goods Act 
(30) S54 Sale of Goods Act 
( 31) Sl3 Sale of Goods Act. 
(32) See Hong Kong Fir Shi22ing Co. Ltd. V Kawasaki 
Kisen 
Kaisha Ltd (1962] 2 QB 26 
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manufacturer may in some circumstances arise. ( 33
) 
A manufacturer's express "warranty" or "guaran
tee" may also 
form a contract with the purchaser. These are 
common today in 
the form of cards which the purchaser complete
s either at the 
point of sale or later and returns, usually by 
post, to the 
manufacturer. Even if not specific in setting 
out details such 
as time limits, these can still form a contrac
t which may be 
sued upon if broken. However all too often in 
the past the 
"guarantee" is in fact an attempt to take away 
from the 
purchaser rights that the purchaser might other
wise have. (34) 
In a typical example (taken from a small applia
nce guarantee 
card) the guarantee reads:-
··" (the manufacturer) shall not be liable ... 
for any 
loss howsoever arising ... otherwise than under
 this 
guarantee .. ". 
A claim in contract allows a number of remedies
 to the 
purchaser. If the contract is suitable specifi
c performance 
could be awarded. Otherwise termination and re
stitution, 
acceptance of the goods with offset of price, r
ejection 
and damages are all available. While these are
 useful remedies 
(33) The classic example being that of the unfo
rtunate Mrs 
Carlill and the carbolic smokeball. Mrs Carlill
 purchased 
the smokeball from a retailer, and it was the m
anufacturer 
who had published the offending advertisment. 
Even so it 
was held that there was a contract between her 
and the 
manufacturer albeit not a contract of sale. 
Carlill~ carbolic Smokeball Co Ltd (1893) CA [
1893) lQB 
256 [1893) 62 LJ QB 257 67 LT 837 
(Since the enactment of the Fair Trading Act 19
86 such 
complaints are likely to be brought within its 
terms) 
(34) S14 Consumer Guarantees Bill deals with m
anufacturers 
express guarantees in an attempt to end this p
ractice. 
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in the business setting they may overlook the desire
 of the 
consumer for a specific remedy of repair or replacem
ent. 
Tort 
It has been settled law since Donoghue~ Stevenson 
(35) that 
a person injured by a faulty product, may be compen
sated by an 
action in tort against the Manufacturer whether or n
ot there 
were the purchaser of the goods. The duty is not li
mited to 
"consumers" in the sense of the actual purchaser. An
y person 
whom the manufacturer ought reasonably to have fores
een as 
being likely to be affected by the defect can mainta
in an 
action. 
The facts in the case are well known and in short w
ere that 
Mrs Donoghue's friend purchased at a cafe a bottle o
f ginger 
beer manufactured by Stevenson. Mrs Donoghue drank 
some of the 
contents the balance of which proved to contain the 
remains of 
two decomposed snails. Mrs Donoghue suffered shock a
nd some 
gastro-enteritus. 
Lord Atkin's summing up of the duty found to be owed
 is worth 
repeating:--
"By Scots and English law alike a manufacturer of pr
oducts 
which he sells in such a form as to show that he int
ends 
them to reach the u l timate consumer in the form in w
hich 
they left him with no reasonable possibility of inte
rmediate 
examination, and with the knowledge that the absence
 of 
reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of 
the 
(35) [1932] AC 5 6 2 [1932] 86 QLR 454 Lords 
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product will result in an injury to the Consumer's life o
r 
property owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasona
ble 
care" 
A manufacturer is also liable to warn the consumer of any 
danger inherent in the use of any non-defective products a
bout 
which the manufacturer knows or ought to have known. The n
ature 
of the warning required will vary as to the circumstances.
 
(36) 
A manufacturer will be able to negate the duty of care wh
ere 
the conduct of the plaintiff was such that they either cle
arly 
contributed to their own misfortune or assumed the risk. 
Contributory negligence by the plaintiff may also reduce a
 
damages award where the manufacturer's negligence is 
nevertheless proven. Thus a purchaser who purchases and u
ses a 
lawn mower uses it to trim hedges and suffers personal inj
ury 
or property damage in the process would be unlikely to rec
over 
against the manufacturer having clearly been the author of
 
their misfortune. (37) 
From the consumers point of view negligence is not a 
particularly satisfactory cause of action. The consumer w
ill 
have to prove that the manufacturer or one of their employ
ees 
(36) Buchan~ Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd. (1986) 25
 
D.L.R. (4th) 658 (Ont. CA) (concerned pharmaceutical drugs
 
:whilst some harmless in most circumstances could have 
serious side effects or contra-indications for some users 
:not necessarily subject to being prescribed by a doctor 
who might warn the user) 
(37) In New Zealand such a person would be compensated for
 
their injury under the Accident Compensation scheme. 
Accordingly the law in this area has not developed as it 
has in other jurisdictions. 
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was negligent and that reasonable care was accordingly not 
taken in the manufacturing process. This presents obvious 
difficulties for the consumer who has no actual knowledge of 
what occurred during the manufacturing process. While the 
plaintiff may argue that the result itself establishes 
the negligence - "res ipsa loquitur" - the manufacturer may be 
able to convince the court that all reasonable care was taken 
and defeat the action. 
In Daniels v White (38) the plaintiff had discovered carbolic 
acid in a lemonade bottle. The plaintiff pleaded "re ipsa 
loquitur" but the manufacturer defended on the basis of 
evidence that he had a safe manufacturing system and adequate 
supervision and thus had taken all reasonable care. This 
somewhat illogical argument was accepted by the Court without 
any apparent consideration as to how, if the system had not 
failed, the carbolic acid had made its way into the bottle. 
Furthermore the manufacturer may be able to shelter behind the 
availability to the purchaser of a "reasonable possibility of 
intermediate examination'' as posited by Lord Atkin. (39) 
How realistic an opportunity to examine goods present day 
consumers may have, and what actual use such an opportunity 
(38) [1938] 160 LT 128, SJ 912 [1938] 4 All ER 258 
(39) Donoghue v Stevenson op cit 
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for inspection might be to them is a moot point. 
The action for damages in negligence is not limited to shock 
and personal injury (40) but extends to property damage and may 
extend to pure economic loss provided such loss is sufficiently 
related to some form of physical damage. (41) 
(40) Junior Books v Veitchi (1983) 1 AC 52 (1982) 3 WLR 477:126 
SJ 538 (1982] 3 All ER 201 (1982) ComLR 221 
(Flooring installed by third party. recovery against 
against contractor) 
(41) Products Liability~ Tortious Recovery for Economic Loss 
VUW Law Review 7 330 PW Bennett. Bennett noted that 
Atiyah (Negligence and economic loss (1967) 83 LQR 248) 
saw no reason post Hedley Byrne! Co Ltd~ Heller! 
Partners Ltd [1964) A.C. 465, (1963) 2 ALL ER 575, (1963) 
3 WLR 101, 107 Sol. Jo. 454, (1963) 1 Lloyd's REP. 485, 
H.L. why a claim for economic loss in tort should be 
denied to a consumer in terms of their right to recover 
for the cost of "putting right" a defective article. If a 
manufacturer can be held to have foreseen physical damage 
then they surely can be held to have foreseen economic 
loss if the test of foreseeability is applied and met in 
each case on the facts. See however The Law of Torts in 
New Zealand Todd (General editor) The Law BookCompany-
Limited 1991 (p.166 4.7.) for a discussion of the 
development in the law since the date of Bennett's 
article. Note also that economic loss consequent to 
personal injury will be compensated under the Accident 
Compensation scheme and that claims in tort for such 
against the party causing the injury are now barred. 
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The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 
The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 has applied to contracts 
entered into since 1 April 1980. Dawson & McLauchlan (42) 
suggest that the inclusion in sl5(d) of that Act of a specific 
exclusion of its application in relation to transactions 
covered by the Sale of Goods Act 1908 other than in respect 
of statements made during negotiation, merger clauses and the 
remedy of damages for misrepresentation was intended to be a 
short term measure until the Sale of Goods Act was fully 
overhauled. 
This of course has yet to occur and section 15(d) of the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 states:-
"Except as provided in sections 4(3), 6(2) and 14 of this 
Act nothing in the Act shall affect .... (d) The Sale of 
Goods Act 1908" 
The Sale of Goods Act therefore continues to be the relevant 
statute in regard to contracts for the sal e of goods with the 
Contractual Remedies Act applicable only in the following 
l imited respects:-
(!) Exemption clauses (Court still able to enquire ) (43 ) 
(2) Amendment of clause 1 3 (3) of the Sa l e o f Goods Act 
concerning acceptance. 
(3) The Contractual Remedies Act clarified which of sections 36 
and 37 of the Sa l e o f Goods Act 1908 was paramount. Now 
it is made clear that it is section 36 . ( 44 ) 
(42) The Contractual Remedies Act 1 979 Sweet & Maxwell 
( 43) S4 Contractual Remedi es Act 
(44) Sl4(l)(b) Contractual Remedies Act 
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(4) Remedies for misrepresentation. 
The Contractual Remedies Act code covering cancellation for 
breach of contractual terms has no application to contracts for 
the sale of goods. As a result there are two separate sets of 
rules and remedies for termination of contracts for breach, one 
for contracts for the sale of goods and one for other 
contracts. Misrepresentation is covered by the Contractual 
Remedies Act but other alleged breaches are usually not. (45) 
In litigation the practical result has been parallel pleadings. 
Damages under section 6(1) Of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 
are available to a purchaser who was induced to enter into the 
purchase contract by a -
" misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, 
made to him by or on behalf or another party to that 
contract" (made by the seller or their agent) 
The damages available on a misrepresentation will be quantified 
... "in the same manner and to the same extent as if the 
representation was a term of the contract that had been 
broken". (46) 
(45) Law Commission Report 25 DF Dugdale & CT Walker 
Harmonisation of the Sale of Goods Act 1908 and the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 
But note s6(2) Contractual Remedies Act. If contract 
provides for a remedy (for example an express guarantee 
given by seller or manufacturer) then s6(l)(a) Contractual 
Remedies Act as to quantum of damages will apply to 
a contract for the sale of goods. 
(46) Note that Hire Purchase contracts are specified as being 
subject to the Contractual Remedies Act. Also the 
old controversy of whether the common law allowed a 
rescission of the sale of goods contract by purchaser on 
an innocent misrepresentation is laid partly to rest by 
the CRA S6(1) as it applies to both innocent and 
fraudulent misrepresentations. 
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The apparent conflict between the remedies available has 
resulted in some interesting judicial reasoning. In Printcorp 
Services V Northern City Publications Ltd (47) a claim for the 
price of newspapers supplied was resisted on the ground that 
the goods were of inferior quality. It was held that the Sale 
of Goods Act and the Contractual Remedies Act were mutually 
exclusive codes as to the purported cancellation and (obiter 
dicta) that it was the relative importance of the goods and 
services which determined which Act was applicable, an 
interesting comment with no apparent support to be obtained 
from the relevant legislation. The Judge then went on to hold 
the Sale of Goods Act applied on the facts and that accordingly 
Northern City Publications Ltd had lost its right to cancel the 
contract following acceptance by the company of the goods in 
question. Any rights Northern had were to set off the price 
with a claim for damages as there had been substantial 
performance. 
The practical result in the case was probably the expedient 
one however the suggestion that the right to cancel depends on 
the relative importance of the goods rather than contractual 
intention highlights the problems that still may arise from 
"acceptance" being a bar to rejection under the Sale of Goods 
Act. In practical terms it is hard to envisage a situation 
where a contracting party would want to relinquish the right to 
cancel if it were available to them. 
The Contractual Remedies Act 1979 thus went only part way 
(47) HC Tauranga CP 60/89 25.4.90 Fisher J 
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when it abolished the second limb of Section 13(3) Sale of 
Goods Act. (48) 
It therefore remains important to differentiate sales from 
other types of dealing so as to determine which set of rules as 
to cancellation will apply. (49) 
The Sale of Goods Act (s55) action for money paid is preserved 
as is the rule in Rowland v Divell (50) leaving the purchaser 
of goods able to rescind for breach of condition as to title 
and recover the full price paid on the ground of total failure 
of consideration even when the purchaser may have had had 
substantial use of the goods. (51) 
One other important difference remains to again be noted. 
Under the Sale of Goods Act property revests in the seller on 
cancellation of the contract. This is not the position under 
the Contractual Remedies Act. This is of particular concern in 
the situation of a mixed contract, for example the common 
contract for provision of goods and services. Cancellation of 
either or both legs of the contract is available for a 
misrepresentation under the Contractual Remedies Act but for 
(48) In cases of the sale of specific goods there 
was apparently no right to reject the goods for breach of 
a condition because of the operation of S20 Rule 1 whereby 
property in specific goods usually passes to the buyer 
when the contract made (and not necessarily upon delivery) 
unless so provided. 
(49) The Consumer Guarantees Act covers both sales and 
transactions that are not sales. Ref s2.CGB 
Both the Contractual Remedies Act and the Sale of Goods 
Act preserve the buyers right to reject goods. 
(50) [1923] 2 KB 500 
(51) Taylor v Combined Buyers Ltd op cit 
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any other breach the question will be whether the provisions of 
the Contractual Remedies Act apply or whether the term breached 
was a condition allowing for cancellation as defined by the 
Sale of Goods Act, one that must be treated as a warranty 
because of the operation of that Act, or a condition, warranty 
or an innominate term of the type giving rise to a right to 
cancel in common law. 
This multiplicity of rules is one with which many lawyers have 
grappled and is beyond the comprehension of the lay person. 
With the enactment of the Consumer Guarantees Act they 
are faced with the addition of another set of rules covering 
the sale of goods with the result that the Contractual Remedies 
Act will cover contracts other than for the sale of Goods, The 
Sale of Goods Act and common law for sales of goods other than 
consumer sales, and the Consumer Guarantees Act for sales of 
goods to consumers. 
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The Fair Trading Act 
The Fair Trading Act 1986 concentrates on the pre-sale asp
ects 
of the contract. While remedies are available to consumers
 for 
proven breaches of the Act, the thrust of the Act is to p
revent 
certain types of conduct and punish offenders when it occ
urs. 
Under the Act it is a offense for a seller to "mislead" o
r 
"deceive" the purchaser or potential purchasers. 
The relevant sections of the Act are:-
Section 9 "Misleading and deceptive conduct generally - No
 
person shall, in trade, engage in conduct that is misleadi
ng 
or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive." and 
Section 10 11 Misleading conduct in relation to goods- No 
person shall, in trade, engage in conduct that is liable t
o 
mislead the public as to the nature, manufacturing process
, 
characteristics, suitability for purpose, or quantity of 
goods." (52) 
The terms" Misleading" and deceptive" are not defined in 
the 
Act. Their dictionary meanings are :-
··"Mislead .. lead astray, cause to go wrong in conduct or 
belief .. " and 
deceive .. make .. believe what is false, mislead 
(52) cf Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aust). s52 and Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Aust). s55A 
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purposefully, use deceit .. " (53) 
Both sections are taken from the Australian Trade Practices 
Act 1974 and have been considered by the Courts many times 
in Australia. The New Zealand Courts have followed their 
Australian counterparts in adopting a broad definition. 
To be categorised as misleading or deceptive or likely to 
mislead or deceive for conduct must contain or convey a 
misrepresentation. (54) A statement may be made that is 
literally true but which may none the less be misleading or 
deceptive as for example in the James Pascoe case (55) in which 
jeweller advertised goods as ''duty free" when those items 
were not such as would in any event have attracted a duty. 
It is not however enough to show that the conduct could simply 
have caused confusion. Confusion alone has been held to not be 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
NZ Pocket Oxford Dictionary Reprint 1990 
Taco Co of Australia~ Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 
177 (1982) ATRP 43 751. Mexican Restaurants. Australian 
restaurant had traded since 1976. US chain "Taco Bell" 
opened in Sydney. Australia company claimed passing off 
as Australian one: Held breach 252 Trade practices Act 
1974 -conduct was deceptive. 
cc v James Pascoe NZ Ltd (1989) 3 TCLR 410 Prosecution 
under S13(g) arose out of complaint by trade competitor to 
Commerce Commission. Pascoe's operated retail jewellery 
shop in Queenstown specialising in the tourist trade 
selling mainly jade and opal jewellery. Competing traders 
complained that the term "duty free" used to promote the 
goods was misleading as it gave the impression that the 
goods were such as to normally be subject to a specific 
duty or tax and that the purchaser was getting them free 
of this additional cost. In fact no such duty attached to 
the goods in question. The statement that the goods were 
"duty free" was therefore true in the literal sense. Held 
that use of term was misleading and that no defense 
available under s44(1)(a) as use of the term was 
deliberate. 
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of itself conclusive evidence that conduct was misleading or 
deceptive but evidence can be brought of confusion on the part 
of consumers in the course of demonstrating the misleading or 
deceptive nature or the conduct, or that it was likely to 
produce such a result. (56) 
The sections do not require that the conduct in question have 
actually mislead or deceived any one. It is sufficient that 
it can be proved "likely" to have done so, or "liable" to do 
so. The term "likely" used in Section 9 has been held to 
impose a strict liability and intent is not therefore a 
necessary element of an offence. (57) Section 9 denotes 
conduct that has a greater potential to mislead or deceive 
than that which under section 10 is "liable" to do so. 
It is not necessary to prove that any damage has actually 
(56) 
(57) 
cc~ Kimberley's Fashions Ltd! Marcel Manufacturers Ltd 
(1989) 3 TCLR 405 Labeling of fashion garments said to be 
misleading. Was "confusion" enough to be misleading? 
Marcel importer leather jackets from Korea. On import had 
label "made in Korea" and also "Marcel Christchurch New 
Zealand". Marcol supplied garments to Kimberley Fashions. 
When inspected on K. Fashions premises the label "made in 
Korea" had been removed. K.Fashions maintained a belief 
that the garments were NZ made. Prosecution under sl3(j) 
FTA. Held was a misleading representation as to country 
of origin of jackets. Kimberley Fashions held to have a 
defence under s44(l)(a) as mislead by importer and that 
mistaken belief reasonable in circumstances. 
Taco co of Australia and James Pascoe op cit 
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been caused at the time of prosecution in terms of section 9. 
(58) While the court may consider the extent of actual damage 
when considering remedies these are not limited to economic 
loss. 
The Fair Trading Act does not prevent the comparative 
advertising of goods. But even if the rival's name is not 
used the advertiser will still be liable to have the 
accuracy of its claims tested. (59) 
If the public or a section of the public has been misled 
or deceived subsequent action by the trader to "put things 
right" whether by advertisment or some other method will not 
excuse their liability for a breach of section 9. (60) 
In some areas the Act goes to conduct that was considered by 
the Courts under the Tort of "passing off''. Both the Taco Co 
and Taylor Bras (61) cases being examples. 
(58) Taylor Bros Ltd~ Taylors Textiles Services Auckland 
Ltd [1988) 2 NZLR 1 (1988) 2 TCLR 447 (1988) 2 NZBLC 
103,032 Plaintiff ran dry-cleaning and towel hire co. 
in Wellington. Defendant recently purchased dry-cleaning 
(run as "Fosters") and linen-hire (run as "Taylors") 
companies. Held was goodwill in name "Taylors Dry 
Cleaning" , that consumers not perceive difference types 
of business - dry cleaning - linen hire- ; Test "is there 
likely to be confusion in the eye of the consumer" -
closely related fields activity more likely confusion; 
Use of name "Taylors" misleading and deceptive in terms 
of section 9 FTA 1986. 
(59) Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd~ Clear Communications Ltd 
30/7/92 Greig J, HC Wellington, CP504/92 
Rival telecommunication companies. Part of a long running 
battle. This case re accuracy of claims re toll charges. 
(60) Tot Toys~ Mitchell 15/7/92 Fisher J, HC Tauranga 
CP186/88 (the buzy-bee case) Two makers of Buzy Bee Toy. 
Published information after compliant not remove liability 
for breach already occurred. 
(61) Op cit 
31 
The cases in involving allegations of breach of the Act in the 
making of false representations are more often the result of a 
complaint made to the Commerce Commission by individual 
consumers as distinct from the "passing off" or "unfair 
competition" allegations which are more usually the result of a 
complaint by a rival trader. A survey of the reported cases 
concerning section 9 and 10 held on the LINX and NETWAY 
databases indicates that to date the majority of cases have 
brought either by the Commerce Commission itself (possibly 
following a consumer complaint) with rival traders a close 
second. Individual complainants who could be termed 
''consumers" seem to have often been stalking horses for rival 
traders. 
False representations as to goods (62) are a major source of 
fair trading complaints both volume of reported cases and in 
the calls and inquiries made to the Consumer Institute and 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs (63) 
In many instances the sum of money involved is small but the 
consumer may feel considerably cheated and aggrieved. 
Section 13 of the Act makes it an offence to "in trade or 
(62) S.13 Fair Trading Act 1986 
(63) Information supplied by Institute and Ministry. 
Note not all inquiries result in a formal complaint. 
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supply" (64) to make false representations as to standard, 
quality, grade, quantity, composition ,style , model or that 
the goods have had a particular history. (65) Further the 
section makes an offence of misstating the origin or age or 
price of goods as well as a number of other matters. 
Cases concerning false representations made by traders as to 
the quality of their goods include a brass bedstead that was 
brass plated (66) and three diamond rings that were cubic 
zirconia (67). 
False representation as to "standard" included children's bed 
clothes that were represented as designed to reduce fire risk 
and were not so designed (68) and false representation as to 
"kind" (69) was found when a fish species not common in the 
retail fish trade was offered to the public under the name of 
another more well known fish species. Breach of the Act's 
provisions was found in all the above cases. 
(64) Defined in section 2 Fair Trading Act 
(65) Section 13 (1) (a) 
(66) CC v A & W Hamilton (1989) 3 TCLR 398 Commerce Commission 
prosecution following on from consumer complaint. 
Breach of FTA found. 
(67) cc~ Old sydenham Town Jewellers (1990) 3 TCLR 440 
Prosecution under sl3(a). Complainant Australian resident 
purchased 3 "diamond" rings from OSTJ. On subsequent 
valuation found to be synthetic stones. The rings were 
very cheap for diamonds but purchaser alleged had been 
representation made that they had been purchased from an 
estate auction. Defendants credibility as a witness did 
not impress judges. Order refund price paid, return of 
rings to OSTJ. Fine $300. 
(68) Connell~~ Q Nathan~ Co Ltd and Farmers Trading Co 
(Wellington) Ltd [1990) 2 NZLR 160 (1988) 3 TCLR 362 
(69) CCV Harbour Inn Seafoods Ltd 17/6/91 Keane JDC 
Wellington 
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The Consumer Affairs and the Commerce Commission receives 
complaints from the public and operate a public information and 
assistance service. The Commerce Commission will under the 
authority vested in it by the Act prosecute complaints where it 
considers such warranted. (70) It is also is open to an 
individual or corporate complainant to do so. The Act does not 
in its definition of trade limit itself to transactions between 
a trader and a consumer. Any class or person (including 
manufacturers) is covered whether in business or not. 
The remedies provided under the Act are contained in part V 
and provide for the imposition of substantial fines for some 
offences (in the case of an individual of up to $30,0000 and 
a body corporate of $100,000:00). Proceedings may be 
commenced up to three years after the offence was committed 
(71). Offences under section 40 of the Act are such as make an 
offender liable on summary conviction (the criminal standard of 
proof being required). 
(70) See Annual Report to Parliament Commerce Commission 
1986-92 also the Commission has since 1986 published 
regular bulletins concerning both prosecutions and 
complaints. See ''Pair's-Fair" It also publishes material 
as a guideline to traders and advertisers to assist them 
in avoiding offending practices. This is one of the 
Commissions' functions under S6 of the Act. 
(71) S40 (3) Fair Trading Act 1986 Note that fines are not 
available for a breach of sections 9, 14 (2) & 23. The 
latter two sections cover situations of physical 
harassment or coercion and whilst such actions would in 
any event fall with the provisions of the Crimes Act the 
lack of provision for a punitive fine for such actions is 
interesting. 
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Other remedies are provided that are aimed at preventing or 
rectifying of bad conduct. The Court may on the application 
of the Commission or any other person grant an injunction 
preventing conduct and (only on the application of the 
Commission) may order that advertisment be made disclosing 
information specified by the Court (72). Injunctions are often 
sought by rival traders alleging inaccurate comparative 
advertising or "passing off". (see the Taylor and Telecom 
cases). 
The Court has further wide ranging powers to make orders 
where it finds that a person (who does not have to have been 
a party to the proceedings) has suffered or is likely to 
suffer loss or damage by conduct of another that contravenes 
the Act. It may declare contracts void (ab initio or 
otherwise), vary contracts to direct that a refund of money be 
made or property returned, direct that loss or damage be paid 
to the party to the contract, to order repair or the provision 
of parts. (73) These are the remedies by which the actual 
consumer may be compensated for his or her loss or damage 
suffered. (74) They do not however extend to providing 
(72) S41 & S42 Fair Trading Act 1986 
(73) S43 Fair Trading Act 1986 See cc~ Old sydenham Town 
Jewellers op cit for such an order in consumers favour. 
(74) There are statutory defences to prosecution for all but 
sections 9, 14(2) and 23 which are set out in section 44. 
They include "reasonable mistake'', reasonable reliance on 
information supplied by another and that the 
contravention was due to the act of another or accident or 
default outside the defendants control. 
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exemplary damages (which the consumer could presumably still 
seek in tort if so inclined). 
There is an exemption for the news media when publishing 
information (advertisments) supplied in the ordinary course 
of business. This exemption does not apply where the 
information was itself supplied by the media organisation in 
question as was the situation in the Wilson & Horton case where 
the newspaper took it upon itself to supply a photograph of 
what it purported to be a "bongo" van for an advertisement 
placed by another person. (75) 
Dangerous products under the Fair Trading Act 
The other side of the coin for the consumer from deception 
is the dangerous product, particularly those that are 
dangerous because of negligent manufacture but do not 
appear on their face to to be inherently dangerous. 
The classic ... "wolf in sheep's clothing instead of an obvious 
wolf. 11 (76) 
The Fair Trading Act has considerable impact on the control 
and regulation of goods that may be unsafe or dangerous. 
The Minister (of Consumer Affairs) is empowered by sections 
27 and 29 to set by regulation Consumer Information Standards 
and Product Safety standards. These provisions have been 
(75) 
(76) 
cc v Wilson & Horton Ltd. (1992) 4 NZBLC 102,871 
Newspaper supplied photograph of "Bongo" van from its 
archives. Van for sale differed in several respects from 
the photograph. 
Hodge~ Anglo American Oil Co (1922) 12 Ll.L.Rep 183,187 
per Scrutton LJ 
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used to set Consumer Information Standards that apply to the 
"Care labelling" of bedding, clothing, yarns and other items 
of fabric or material (77). The labelling as to country of 
origin of clothing and footwear (78) attempts to prevent the 
inhalation of fibre by under three year olds (79) and the 
safety of toys (80) and bicycles (81). 
Goods determined to be unsafe may be made the subject of a 
compulsory recall order made by the Minister and gazetted. 
The Minister may by this notice declare "goods or any 
description or any class or classes of goods will or may 
cause injury to any person" (82) The notice remains in force 
for up to 18 months and a product safety standard may be put in 
place. If no product safety standard is put into place then the 
Minister may under section 31(3) prohibit all supply of those 
goods. It then becomes an offence for any person to "supply or 
offer to supply or advertise to supply goods" which are the 
subject of a notice. 
As an example products subject to notices prohibiting supply 
(77) Consumer Information Standards (Care Labelling) 
Regulations 1992/90 
(78) Consumer Information Standards (Country of Origin 
(Clothing and footwear) labelling) Regulations 1992/360 
(79) Consumer Information Standards (Fibre Content 
Labelling) 
Regulations 1992/89 
(80) Product Safety Standards (Childrens Toys) Regulations 
1992 / 91 
(81) Product Safety Standards (Pedal Bicycles) Regulations 
1991/225 
(82) Sections 31 and 32 
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have been "glitter bangles" (which were filled with unpurified 
water which contained high levels of bacteria) (83) and "pistol 
crossbows" (marketed as childrens toys they did not have safety 
catches and fired a bolt with more than considerable force) 
( 8 4) • 
The Act provides a clear incentive to manufacturers to co-
operate in the production of a product safety standard or 
risk having all supply prohibited. In the course of research 
the writer discovered that no representatives of major 
retailers were prepared to discuss issues arising out of 
product recalls "on the record". Two retailers spoken to 
expressed concern about the actions of the Commerce Commission 
in regard to the recall of goods that they had stocked. In 
fact on an examination of the compulsory recalls made to date 
manufacturers and retailers would seem to have little to fear. 
To date the majority of such notices of prohibition have 
related to items promoted as childrens toys particularly 
those aimed at the under three years age group. The Commerce 
Commission has adopted the procedure of discussions with 
manufacturers (and if relevant, retailers) over unsafe goods 
often resulting in a voluntary recall of product. 
The procedure for making the orders, involving as it does 
gazetting of the notice, is bureaucratically long winded 
(83) Gazetted 4 October 1990 
(84) Gazetted 19 October 1990 
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and, according to one retailer, so much so that the unsafe 
products may well all have been sold well in advance of the 
notice. Few products are compulsorily recalled prior to 
actual harm being suffered by a consumer as it is the injured 
consumer who brings the Commissions attentions to bear on the 
product. 
The Minister, in making decisions concerning product recall is 
open to have that decision judicially reviewed and overturned 
if shown to have been made recklessly or negligently. 
At least one challenge has been brought to the Minister's 
decision. In Issac v Minister of Consumer Affairs (85) - -
the Minister had exercised her power to recall bicycles sold by 
Issac an investigation by the Ministry of Transport having 
apparently found them to be unsafe. Issac alleged that there 
had been procedural and substantive unfairness and that the 
advice given to the Minister prior to making her decision to 
issue the notice had failed to disclose relevant material. 
Issac's application was declined both because the both on 
application of the legal tests for procedural unfairness. 
and on the Judge's finding that the facts clearly disclosed 
that the bicycles in question were unsafe. 
Issac was not without reason to be upset however. A product 
recall with its attendant media publicity (in part by way of 
Ministry press releases) can inflict considerable financial 
impact on a manufacturer or retailer. 
(85) [1990) 2 NZLR 606 (HC Dunedin Tipping J) 7 
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Because of this, retailers may be wary of publicly commen
ting 
on the recall procedure, preferring to maintain cordial 
relations with the Commission if at all possible. 
The Fair Trading Act provisions concerning unsafe product
s do 
not amount to a product liability regime as exists in oth
er 
jurisdictions. The Act does not impose any strict liabili
ty 
to the consumer upon manufacturers but rather provides fo
r a 
method of removing from the market products already found 
to be 
unsafe. 
The Consumer Guarantees Act 
This Act, enacted this term, creates a new regime for con
tracts 
for the sale of some goods between those persons who fall 
within its definition of "consumers" "manufacturers" and 
"suppliers" (86). In contrast to the Fair Trading Act and
 Sale 
of Goods Act the Act's provisions extend into the area of 
post-
sale consumer protection. 
The Act does not apply to sales at auction or by competit
ive 
tender (87) nor will it give any protection to the person wh
o 
receives goods by way of a charitable gift from a charity 
when 
the gift is for that person's benefit. (88) This exclusion
 will 
have the effect of taking out of the Bill's protection tho
se 
who are reliant on food banks and arguably a group more in
 need 
than most of the law's protection yet less likely to want 
to 
(86) S.2 Consumer Guarantees Act. Note the definition of 
Suppliers includes Financiers within the meaning of the 
Credit Contracts Act 1981 in some circumstances. 
The Act does not only apply to sales but will cover a 
number of other transactions. 
(87) s.42 Consumer Guarantees Act 
(88) s.40 Consumer Guarantees Act 
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complain to the immediate donor. 
The Act will not replace the Sale of Goods Act nor is it a 
code. It contains a saving provision that will, in turn, 
continue the saving contained in the Sale of Goods Act of the 
rules of common law that were not amended or replaced by that 
Act. (89) 
The Consumer Guarantees Act defines the consumer as one who:-
... 11(a) Acquires from a supplier goods or services of a 
kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic, or 
household use or consumption: and 
(b) Does not acquire the goods or services or hold himself 
or herself out as acquiring the goods or services for the 
purpose of-
(i) resupplying them in trade; or 
(ii) consuming them in the course of a process of 
production or manufacture; or 
(iii) in the case of goods, repairing or treating in 
trade other goods or fixtures in land. 
This test of who is a 11 consumer 11
 focuses on the nature of the 
goods rather than their monetary value. (90) Goods themselves 
are defined widely so as to only exclude residential buildings 
(noting that non residential removable buildings are included). 
In transactions covered by the Act the terms implied into 
contracts by the Sale of Goods Act 1908 are replaced by 
a new series of implied 11 guarantees
11 (the words condition and 
(89) see s4 Consumer Guarantees Act and s60 Sa l e of Goods Act 
1908. 
(90) S2 Consumer Guarantees Act: Compare Trade Practices Act 
1974 Aust. 
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warranty are strenuously avoided in the Act). The concept of 
merchantable quality, still not satisfactorily judicially 
defined in over eighty years, is replaced by the more modern 
sounding "acceptable quality" and "fitness for particular 
purpose" guarantees contained in sections 6, 7 and 8 of the 
Act. Whilst these terms are more fully defined within the Act 
than were those contained in the Sale of Goods Act they will 
still be the subject of judicial interpretation in the future. 
Defective goods may still be sold to consumers but if a 
retailer is to avoid liability then the defects must be drawn 
to the consumers attention prior to purchase. (91) 
The guarantee as to title contained in section 5 of the Act 
goes not only to the sellers right to sell the goods and that 
they be free from any undisclosed security. (92) It also goes 
to the right of the purchaser to undisturbed possession. 
This right however comes with a proviso that where the consumer 
is in possession under any agreement for supply then oral 
advice alone of the terms that might result in loss of the 
right to undisturbed possession in terms that a reasonable 
consumer might understand will not be enough. The purchaser 
must acknowledge this in writing. (93) 
Also contained are guarantees as to price (which goes further 
(91) S7(2) Consumer Guarantees Act 
(92) S5(a) & (b) Consumer Guarantees Act 
(93) S5(A) altered by select committee. The practical effect 
of this presumably being that consumers will be asked by 
the retailer to sign an acknowledgement. Ideally this 
should contain the relevant advice as to the title 
position. 
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than that contained in section 10 of the Sale of Goods Act in 
that it also provides for a remedy if the guarantee is 
breached. (94) That the goods comply with description (95), 
and that they comply with sample (96). These latter two 
guarantees should assist consumers in cases of sales by 
description of the the type outlined in Taylor v Combined 
Buyers Ltd and still common. 
There is also a guarantee to the consumer from both 
manufacturer and supplier of goods that repair facilities and 
spare parts will be available post sale. (97) 
Manufacturers (and retailers) may avoid the need to make such 
provision if :-
... "reasonable action is taken to notify the consumer who 
first acquires the goods from a supplier at or before the 
time the goods are supplied, that the Manufacturer does not 
undertake that repair facilities and parts will be 
available for those goods ... or that such may not be 
available after a specified time ... " (98) 
This is a practical approach, particularly in the case of 
imported items, however for the consumer the only change may be 
to the label on the goods or the erection of a sign at the 
point of sale advising that the manufacturer does not 
guarantee repair or spare parts availability. In a perceived 
quality driven market, such as presently exists for whiteware, 
(94) Sll consumer Guarantees Act 
(95) S9 Consumer Guarantees Act 
(96) SlO Consumer Guarantees Act 
(97) Ibid NZLR [1924] 627 
(98) Sl2 Consumer Guarantees Act: Guarantee does not apply to 
second hand goods. 
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a manufacturer has an incentive to offer repair facilities but 
the effect on a market that is entirely price driven (such as 
discount chains) may well be negligible. This certainly was 
the opinion expressed to the writer by the Sales Manager 
of a large (New Zealand wide) discount chain. 
Consumers Remedies under the Act 
Under the Act the consumer will have a remedy against both the 
seller and the manufacturer of goods. Where the failure by the 
goods to comply with an implied term is capable of remedy then 
the consumer may:-
... 11(a) Require the supplier to remedy the failure within a 
reasonable time 11 
(b) Where a supplier who has been required to remedy a 
failure refuses or neglects to do so, or does not succeed 
in doing so within a reasonable time -
(i) Have the failure remedied elsewhere and obtain from 
the supplier all reasonable costs incurred ... 
(ii) .... reject the goods in accordance with Section 
2 2 • • • • II 
Where the failure to comply or breach of the implied term is 
either not capable of remedy or is of a substantial character 
(99) then the consumer may:-
... 11(a) ... reject to goods in accordance with section 22 •• 
or 
(b) Obtain from the supplier damages in compensation for 
any reduction in value of the goods below the price paid 
(99) As defined in the Act, note the similarity of approach 
with that of S7 of the Contractual Remedies Act. 
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or payable II 
As well as the above remedies the consumer may also seek 
damages from the supplier for:-
... "any loss or damage to the consumer resulting from the 
failure (other than loss or damage through reduction in 
value of the goods) which was reasonably foreseeable as 
liable to result from the failure". (100) 
The consumer will not now be subject to the problems arising 
out of ''acceptance" of the goods under the Sale of Goods Act. 
The purchasers initial "acceptance" of the goods does not limit 
the right of rejection. If the goods breach one or more of the 
implied guarantees contained in the Act, and the the failure 
is not capable of remedy or if it is of a "substantial 
character" then the purchaser can either reject the goods or 
obtain damages in compensation for loss of value. (101) 
Further the consumer now has the right to seek a remedy against 
the manufacturer of the goods. If the goods fail to comply 
with the implied guarantees as to acceptable quality, 
correspondence with description, repair and parts or any 
express guarantee given by the manufacturer (102) then the 
consumer has the right to seek damages against the 
manufacturer on the same basis as against the retailer. If the 
breach complained of is of an express guarantee given by the 
manufacturer the consumer is required to allow the manufacturer 
(100) S18 Consumer Guarantees Act 
(10l)S18(3) Consumer Guarantees Act 
(102)S25 Consumer Guarantees Act 
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opportunity to remedy the defect either by repairing or 
replacing of the goods. (103) The manufacturer or retailer 
has a right to cure the defect which extends to refunding the 
price paid. In some situations where for example the defect is 
minor a retailer might well prefer to be able to choose to 
whether to replace or repair the goods complained of or to 
refund the price paid. 
Section 22 sets out how the purchaser must go about a 
rejection of defective goods. It may be done it by 
letter or in person but the goods must be returned (except in 
limited situations where it is not possible to do so whereupon 
the seller then has a right to collect the goods). 
The rejection of the goods will re-vest the property in the 
supplier, an explicit preservation of the existing position 
under the Sale of Goods Act and in contrast with the scheme of 
the Contractual Remedies Act. 
The Act has been welcomed by Consumer interest groups as being 
a strong step in the direction of consumer protection. 
However there have been concerns expressed about the failure to 
harmonise the various strands of the law and provide a complete 
codification of the law relating to formation of and breach of 
contracts (not only sales transactions). (104) 
These same concerns about the lack of harmony in the law were 
expressed in the Law Commission Report number 25 (105) 
(103)S27(2) & Sl9 consumer Guarantees Act 
(104) Information and comments made to the writer by a staff 
member of the Consumer Institute and a senior advisor 
Citizen's Advice Bureau. 
(105) Ibid (45) 
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The Impact of Accident Compensation 
Since Donoghue~ Stevenson (106) the focus of negligence cases 
involving a manufacturer's liability was on those products 
which had caused injury or damage to the person or property of 
the individual. (107) Since 1 April 1974 it has not been 
possible to bring an action in New Zealand for personal injury 
or death suffered after that date. (108) The 1972 and 1982 
Accident Compensation Acts replaced tort actions arising out of 
"personal injury by accident" with compensation provided at set 
levels from a single source and the jurisdiction for 
determining what was a "personal injury by accident" vested at 
first instance with the Accident Compensation Corporation 
itself. The Acts barred all claims for damages (whether in 
tort or under the Deaths by Accident Compensation Act 1952) 
that arose directly or indirectly out of personal injury. 
This bar was not in fact complete although I suggest that the 
lay person would have believed it to be so. If the plaintiffs 
cause of action arose prior to 1 April 1974 and had been 
concealed by a fraud then the six year limitation period set 
down by the Limitation Act 1950 for personal injury claims was 
not applicable and suit could still be brought. (109) 
At least one action arising before the legislative cut off 
(106) 
(107) 
(108) 
(109) 
[1964] AC 465 
Hadley~ Baxendale et Exch 9 Exch (Welsby, Hurstone and 
Gordon) 341, (1854) 156 Eng Rep 145 
S27(1) Accident Compensation Act 1982 (cf: S5 (1) 
Accident Compensation Act 1972) S8 Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 
Green v Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR 546 (CA) A surviving 
patient of the "unfortunate incident" at National Womens 
Hospital attempting to bring a tort action against the 
then Professor alleged to have been conducting the 
"experiment". 
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date was still being heard a decade later. Exemplary damages 
in tort remained available during the currency of the 
ACC Schemes as they were held not to arise directly out of the 
personal injury by accident. (110) Some other statute based 
claims such as under the Carriage by Air Act 1967 also survived 
the Accident Compensation regime. In general however, following 
the introduction of the Accident Compensation Schemes there was 
no longer any particular impetus for the plaintiff to seek 
recompense for their injury through the courts. 
Two points however arise out of the operation of the 
Compensation system. Firstly it has been suggested by several 
writers including one of the authors of a recent text The Law 
of Torts in New Zealand (111) that a primary reason for the 
failure of a strict liability product liability regime to 
develop in New Zealand has been the existence of the 
compensation scheme. 
Secondly the scheme itself has undergone major alteration in 
1992 with the enactment of the Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Act and amendments which by considerably 
altering the policy and approach of the previous schemes may 
well have a direct impact on public perception as to the need 
for a strict product liability regime. 
As to the first issue it is interesting to note that in the 
years since Donoghue v Stevenson (and in the United States 
(110) Donselaar v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 97 One brother 
assaulted another, claim made under ACC scheme for 
compensation, did that bar tort exemplary damages. Held 
that the tort action survived the Act. 
(111) Todd, Burrows, Chambers, Mulgan, Vennell Law Book Company 
1991. 
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since MacPherson v Buick (112) There has been considerable 
development in the intervening years in other jurisdictions 
towards a strict manufacturers product liability. Introduced 
judicially in the United States the concept is now accepted 
law. The American Restatement of Tort provides that:-
S.402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical 
Harm to User or Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his 
property,if 
(a)the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product and 
(b)it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold. 
(2) The Rule in subsection (1) applies though 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from 
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
This expresses in a nutshell the concept of strict product 
liability. The absence of privity is essential for it such a 
duty to operate to benefit those other than the actual 
(112) 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) NY Court of Appeals, 
Cardozo J, M brought car from dealer who purchased from 
manufacturer B. Wheel defective wood, car collapsed, M 
injured. B held liable to M. 
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purchaser. It is not however true to say that the 
manufacturer is simply an insurer, his liability is strict in 
the sense that it rests on no proof of negligence, and his 
product must still meet the test of being "unreasonable 
dangerous". 
Compare this with Lord Aitken's test in Donoghue v Stevenson 
(whereby the manufacturer may shelter behind the lack of proof 
of negligence) and the progress over the years in the United 
States towards a greater protection of the consumer is clear. 
The Australians took the step to abolish the negligence 
requirement in the Trade Practices Act 1974 and the British did 
the same with the Consumer protection Act in 1979 yet in New 
Zealand no real progress away from the essential concepts of 
the tort of negligence were made. The Accident Compensation 
Schemes were not introduced until the 1970's. Certainly any 
impetus for such development was driven in other jurisdictions 
by personal injury cases (113) and the existence of the schemes 
removed this impetus. 
Why then the lack of progress? Products were no more safe in 
New Zealand than elsewhere and consumer concerns were no less 
vocally expressed. (114) Perhaps one difference lay also in 
the nature of the New Zealand market. In the years from 1930 up 
until the election of the third Labour government New Zealand 
was a strongly regulated economy. Imports of goods into the 
(113) Prosser & Keeton on Torts (op cit) contains 
detail on the American position including brief 
historical background. 
(114) See annual reports of NZ Consumer Council to Parliament 
and any issue of ''Consumer" magazine published during the 
1970-1972 period. 
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country were tightly controlled by a strict licensing system 
and complaints were common about the limited range of products 
available in the retail market. (115) The focus of the 
Woodhouse Report (116) and the subsequent legislation was to be 
on physical injury to the person, whether in work related, 
motor vehicle or other situations. Interestingly, with the 
exception of bicycles, the Accident Compensation Corporation 
does not appear to have under either scheme published 
statistics that would indicate how many claims each year are 
individual product related. This is despite one of the main 
focus points of the Corporation being on "injury 
prevention". (117) 
Another difference lay in the inability to bring "class 
action" suits under the both old Code of Civil Procedure and 
now again under the High Court Rules and the continuing Law 
Society disapproval of contingency fees. Where a plaintiff 
will have to bear "up front" the entire cost of litigation 
there is clearly less incentive for them to proceed with a less 
than certain action. 
The Accident Compensation scheme has been criticised outside 
New Zealand for its omissions in the area of product liability 
but criticism within New Zealand in this regard appears to have 
been rather more muted. (118) 
(115) Import/ export/ trade figures see New Zealand Year Book 
(annual) 
(116) "Compensation for personal injury in New Zealand" 1967 
Report of Royal Commission Chaired by Hon Mr Justice 
Woodhouse 
(117) Annual Report Accident Compensation Corporation 1991, 
and 1992. 
(118) The Law of Torts in New Zealand. Ibid p79 
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The introduction of a altered compensation scheme by the 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 may 
now have an impact on the public perception of a need for 
product liability. A substantial feature of the previous 
schemes was the availability of "lump sum'' payments to 
claimants who suffered both physical and emotional or 
psychological damage. Sums of up to $27,000:00 were available 
together with an on going right to a payment based on 
percentage (80% in most cases) of the injured persons previous 
average income. Whilst the Act did not (for policy reasons) 
discriminate between those engaged in legal or illegal activity 
at the time of the injury it did discriminate against those 
(often women) who had not held paid employment. 
Furthermore those unfortunate enough to be incapacitated 
through illness as opposed to accident were placed in a 
distinctly less financially advantageous position. 
People disabled by illness could claim a sickness or invalids 
benefit under the Social Security Act. This payment was 
considerably less than the earnings related sum payable under 
the Accident Compensation scheme. Further there was increasing 
concern as to the sustainable financial viability of the 
scheme. Following the Working Party Report on ACC reform in 
1989 (119) the then Labour Government introduced the 
Rehabilitation and Incapacity Bill 1990. Following Labour's 
subsequent electoral loss the National party convened the 
Ministerial Working Party on the Accident Compensation 
(119) See also Law Commission Report No.4 9 May 1988 
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Corporation and Incapacity. The Accident Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Insurance Bill was introduced in 1991 and enacted 
(after amendment) in March 1992. The scheme became fully 
operational on 1 July 1992. The Act reflected the National 
Party's stated election policy of making "the state and the 
individual share responsibility for funding health care and 
income maintenance in cases of sickness and accidents outside 
the workplace". (120) 
Lump sum payments are a thing of the past and are replaced by a 
new periodic "disability" payment which in some cases may be 
paid in conjunction with the relevant social welfare benefit. 
This change was financially driven (121) however there 
has been considerable media comment to the effect that 
the new scheme interferes with or betrays the "trade off" 
made by the New Zealand public in 1974. 
The argument as it is put is that the public "traded-off'' their 
right to bring an action in tort against the person responsible 
for their injury against a guaranteed cover under the scheme 
and accordingly that if coverage is to be reduced then the tort 
action should be restored. This argument gains some support 
from the fact that the new Act does indeed reinstate the old 
tort action in some limited circumstances. If for example a 
claim does not fall within the Act's definition of "medical 
misadventure" a tort claim may not be brought against the 
health professional or institution concerned. (122) 
(120) National Party Election 1990 Health Policy Manifesto. 
(121) Refer Working Party Report and ACC Annual Report. 
for outline. 
(122) Ref S5 Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance 
Act 1992 and S3 ARCI Amendment ( No.2) 1993. 
for definition of medical misadventure. 
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If the comments of the writer's clients are any indication then 
this argument has considerable popular currency. (123) 
It is unsound in some respects. The figures supplied in the 
Woodhouse report as to the recovery rates under the old tort 
scheme speak for themselves. Few plaintiffs recovered a 
considerable sum, all had to prove negligence and pay 
considerable legal costs. For those who could prove negligence 
against a wealthy defendant the result might well have proven 
to be a windfall but in the great majority of cases it was not. 
If however the public perception of the present compensation 
scheme does not alter it may be that there will be in New 
Zealand sufficient impetus to bring about progress towards a 
statutory product liability regime. 
(123) Refer full page advertisement "Sunday Times" 5 September 
1993 : NZ Engineering Union Inc. "Demand the right to sue 
the unsafe employer". 
Refer also to the comments made by L. Cairms on 11 3 
National News" Television 3. 25 September 1993. 
54 
Bibliography 
J.G. Fleming 
T. Housden & M. Copeland 
(Ed) 
Law Commission 
Law Commission 
Fleming on Torts 8th Edition 
Brookers Fair Trading 
Law Book Company 1992 
Report No.4 Personal Injury 
Prevention and Recovery 
Wellington 1988 
Report No. 5 : Harmonisation of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1908 and the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 
D.F. Dugdale & C.T. Walker 
Wellington 1993 
Martindale Hubble Law Digest 1993 
B. McCormas 
Prosser & Keeton 
Russell & Miller 
Todd, Burrows, Chambers 
Mulgan and Vennell 
Fair Trading 
NZ Law Conference Papers 
Christchurch 1987, 198 
Torts 
West Publishing Company 
St Paul Minnisota. 
Annotated Trade Practices Act 
Law Book Company 1993 
The Law of Torts in New Zealand 
Law Book Company 1991 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. 
AW _IBRA . 
I VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
• ,,1lli''ilrfllrl'r 11' 11rn11J'r 1rm 
3 7212 00410331 1 
D'A 
Consumer 
protection and 
product liability 

